

Texto 1 (Diógenes Laércio II 92; tradução V. Tsouna)

They [the Cyrenaics] said that the *pathe* are apprehensible <καταληπτά> themselves, not the things from which they derive.

Texto 2 (Cícero, *Academica priora* II vii 20 = SSR IV A 209; tradução V. Tsouna)

Why should we speak of touch and indeed of what the philosophers call internal touch of either pleasure or pain, in which alone, the Cyrenaics believe, lies the criterion of the true because it [sc. the true] is sensed [through it]?

Texto 3 (Cícero, *Academica priora* II xxiv 76 = SSR IV A 209; tradução V. Tsouna)

What do you think of the Cyrenaics, by no means contemptible philosophers? They deny that there is anything that can be perceived from the outside: the only things that they do perceive are those which they sense by internal touch, for instance pain or pleasure, and they do not know whether something has a particular colour or sound, but only sense that they are themselves affected in a certain way.

Texto 4 (Cícero, *Academica priora* II xlvi 142 = SSR IV A 209; tradução V. Tsouna)

One view of the criterion is that of Protagoras, who holds that what appears to a person is true for that person, another is that of the Cyrenaics, who believe that there is no criterion whatever except the inmost affects, another is that of Epicurus, who places the whole criterion in the senses and in the primary notions of things and in pleasure.

Texto 5 (Anónimo, *Commentarius in Platonis Theaetetus* 65.19-35 = SSR IV A 214; tradução U. Zilioli. ligeiramente alterada)

Something is the agent, something else is the patient. But, if people undergo affections <πάθη> that are opposed to the thing in itself, they will agree that the intrinsic feature of the agent is not defined. Because of this, the Cyrenaics say that only affections are apprehensible <καταληπτά>, while external things are inapprehensible <άκατάληπτα>. That I am being burnt – they say – I apprehend; that the fire is such as to burn is obscure. If it were such, all things will be burnt by it.

Texto 6 (Arístocles de Messina, *apud* Eusébio de Cesareia, *Praeparatio evangelica* XIV xix 1; tradução E. H. Gifford)

Next in order will be those who say that the *pathe* alone are conceptional <καταληπτά>, and this was asserted by some of the Cyrenaics. For they, as if oppressed by a kind of torpor, maintained that they knew nothing at all unless some one standing by struck and pricked them; for when burned or cut, they said, they knew that they felt something, but whether what burned them was fire, or what cut them iron, they could not tell.

Texto 7 (Plutarco, *Adversus Colotem* 26, 1120f1-6; tradução K. Lampe)

So if belief abides by experiences <τοῖς πάθεσιν> it remains unerring. However, if it goes beyond them and becomes meddlesome, it disturbs itself and quarrels with others by making judgments and assertions about externals, because those others receive contrary experiences and different impressions from the same things.

Texto 8 (Plutarco, *Adversus Colotem* 24-26 = 1120b11-1121e9 = SSR IV A 211; tradução W. Goodwin)

24. Colotes then, having got rid of the old philosophers, turns to those of his own time, but without naming any of them; though he would have done better either to have reproved by name these moderns, as he did the ancients, or else to have named neither of them. But he who has so often employed his pen against Socrates, Plato, and Parmenides, evidently demonstrates that it is through cowardice he dares not attack the living, and not for any modesty or reverence, of which he showed not the least sign to those who were far more excellent than these. But his meaning is, as I suspect, to assault the Cyrenaics first, and afterwards the Academics, who are followers of Arcesilaus. For it was these who doubted of all things; but those, placing the passions and imaginations <τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς φαντασίας> in themselves, were of opinion that the belief proceeding from them is not sufficient for the assuring and affirming of things; but, as if it were in the siege of a town, abandoning what is without, they have shut themselves up in the passions, using only *it seems*, and not asserting *it is*, of things without. And therefore they cannot, as Colotes says of them, live or have the use of

things. And then speaking comically of them, he adds: 'These deny that there is a man, a horse, a wall; but say that they themselves (as it were) become walls, horses, men', or 'are impressed with the images of walls, horses, or men'. In which he first maliciously abuses the terms, as calumniators are usually wont to do. For though these things follow from the sayings of the Cyrenaics, yet he ought to have declared the fact as they themselves teach it. For they affirm that things then become sweet, bitter, lightsome, or dark, when each thing has in itself the natural unhindered efficacy of one of these impressions. But if honey is said to be sweet, an olive-branch bitter, hail cold, wine hot, and the nocturnal air dark, there are many beasts, things, and men that testify the contrary. For some have an aversion for honey, others feed on the branches of the olive-tree; some are scorched by hail, others cooled with wine; and there are some whose sight is dim in the sun but who see well by night. Wherefore opinion, containing itself within these impressions, remains safe and free from error; but when it goes forth and attempts to be curious in judging and pronouncing concerning exterior things, it often deceives itself, and opposes others, who from the same objects receive contrary impressions and different imaginations.

25. And Colotes seems properly to resemble those young children who are but beginning to learn their letters. For, being accustomed to learn them where they see them in their own hornbooks and primers, when they see them written anywhere else, they doubt and are troubled; so those very discourses, which he praises and approves in the writings of Epicurus, he neither understands nor knows again, when they are spoken by others. For those who say that the sense is truly informed and moulded when there is presented one image round and another broken, but nevertheless permit us not to pronounce that the tower is round and the oar broken, confirm their own passions and imaginations, but they will not acknowledge and confess that the things without are so affected. But as the Cyrenaics must say that they are imprinted with the figure of a horse or of a wall, but do not speak of the horse or the wall; so also it is necessary to say that the sight is imprinted with a figure round or with three unequal sides, and not that the tower is in that manner triangular or round. For the image by which the sight is affected is broken; but the oar whence that image proceeds is not broken. Since then there is a difference between the impression and the external subject, the belief must

either remain in the impression, or else – if it maintains the being in addition to the appearing – be reproved and convinced of untruth. And whereas they cry out and are offended in behalf of the sense, because the Cyrenaics say not that the thing without is hot, but that the impression made on the sense is such; is it not the same with what is said touching the taste, when they say that the thing without is not sweet, but that some impression and motion about the sense is such? And for him who says that he has received the apprehension of a human form, but perceives not whether it is a man, whence has he taken occasion so to say? Is it not from those who affirm that they receive an apprehension of a bowed figure and form, but that the sight pronounces not that the thing which was seen is bowed or round, but that a certain effigies of it is such? Yes, by Jupiter, will some one say; but I, going near the tower or touching the oar, will pronounce and affirm that the one is straight and the other has many angles and faces; but he, when he comes near it, will confess that it seems and appears so to him, and no more. Yes certainly, good sir, and more than this, when he sees and observes the consequence, that every imagination is equally worthy of belief for itself, and none for another; but that they are all in like condition. But this your opinion is quite lost, that all the imaginations are true and none false or to be disbelieved, if you think that these ought to pronounce positively of that which is without, but those you credit no farther than that they are so affected. For if they are in equal condition as to their being believed, when they are near or when they are far off, it is just that either upon all of them, or else not upon these, should follow the judgment pronouncing that a thing is. But if there is a difference in the being affected between those that are near and those that are far off, it is then false that one sense and imagination is not more express and evident than another. Therefore those which they call testimonies and counter-testimonies are nothing to the sense, but are concerned only with opinion. So, if they would have us following these to pronounce concerning exterior things, making being a judgment of opinion, and what appears an affection of sense, they transfer the judicature from that which is totally true to that which often fails.

26. But how full of trouble and contradiction in respect of one another these things are, what need is there to say at present?

Texto 9 (Sexto, *Adversus mathematicos* VII 190.1-200.9 = SSR A 213; tradução R. Bett)

Cyrenaics (190–200) (190) But now that the Academics' story has been given, from Plato onward, it is perhaps not beside the point also to review the Cyrenaics' position. For these men's school seems to have emerged from the discourse of Socrates, from which the Platonist tradition also emerged. (191) The Cyrenaics, then, say that effects on us⁸⁰ are the criteria, and that they alone are apprehended and turn out to be free from mistakes, but that of the things that have brought about the effects none is apprehensible or free of deceit. For, they say, that we are whitened and we are sweetened,⁸¹ it is possible to say without deceit and truly and firmly and irrefutably; but that the thing productive of the effect is white or sweet, it is not possible to assert. (192) For it is probable that one is disposed whitely even by a thing that is not white and that one is sweetened even by a thing that is not sweet. For the person with vertigo or with jaundice is activated yellowly by everything, and the person with ophthalmia is reddened, and the person who presses on his eye is activated as if by two things, and the crazy person sees Thebes double and imagines the sun double,⁸² (193) and in all these cases, that they are affected in this way (for example, they are yellowed or reddened or doubled) is true, but that the thing that activates them is yellow or reddish or double is thought to be false. And so, too, it very much stands to reason that we are not able to grasp anything more than the effects that belong to us.⁸³ Hence one must posit as apparent either effects on us or the things that are productive of the effects. (194) And if we say that effects on us are apparent, then it must be said that everything apparent is true and apprehensible; but if we declare as apparent the things that are productive of the effects, everything apparent is false and inapprehensible. For the effect that happens in us reveals to us nothing more than itself. Hence in fact (if we must tell the truth) only the effect is apparent to us; the external thing productive of the effect is perhaps a being, but it is not apparent to us.

(195) And in this way we are all unerring with respect to effects (the ones belonging to ourselves, anyway), but we all go wrong with respect to

⁸⁰ *Pathē*, often translated "feelings" or, in other contexts, "passions" or "emotions." But *pathos* is the noun cognate with *paschō*, "be affected," and may refer to anything that *happens to one*. To avoid begging the question on the nature of the entities under discussion, I translate *pathos* throughout as "effect" – sometimes adding "on us" to make clear that it is effects on human beings that are at issue.

⁸¹ On this curious Cyrenaic terminology (see also 192, "disposed whitely," "activated yellowly," etc.), see V. Tsouna, *The Epistemology of the Cyrenaic School* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. ch. 3. Such terminology is later employed on occasion by Sextus himself.

⁸² A reference to Pentheus in Euripides' *Bacchae* (918–919). ⁸³ I.e., that occur in us.

the externally existing thing. And the former are apprehensible while the latter is inapprehensible, the soul being too weak to discern it as a result of the locations, the distances, the movements, the changes, and lots of other causes. Hence they say that there is not even a criterion common to humanity, but that common names are placed on objects.⁸⁴ (196) For everyone in common calls something white or sweet, but they do not *have* something white or sweet in common. For each person grasps the effect that is his own, but on the question whether this effect comes about in him and in his neighbor from a white thing, neither can he himself say, since he does not receive the effect on his neighbor, nor can his neighbor, since he does not receive the one that happens to the other person. (197) But since no common effect comes about in us, it is rash to say that what appears a certain way to me also appears that way to the next person. For perhaps I am put together in such a way as to be whitened by the thing that strikes me from outside, but the other person has his senses designed so as to be disposed differently. What is apparent to us, then, is absolutely not common.⁸⁵ (198) And that in fact we are not activated in the same way, given the different designs of our senses, is clear in the case of people with jaundice and people with ophthalmia and people in a natural condition. For just as the first group are affected yellowly, the second redly, and the third whitely from the same thing, so it is probable that even those in a natural condition are not activated in the same way from the same things, given the different design of their senses, but rather that the grey-eyed person is activated one way, the blue-eyed person another way, and the black-eyed person another way. So that we place common names on objects, but the effects that we get from them are our own.

(199) Similar, too, to what these men say about criteria seems to be what they say about ends. For effects on us extend also to ends. For of effects some are pleasant, some are painful, and some are in between. And the painful ones they say are bad, and their end is pain, while the pleasant ones are good, and their end (no mistake about it) is pleasure, and the things in between are neither good nor bad, and their end is the neither-good-nor-bad, which is an effect in between pleasure and pain. (200) Effects on us, then, are criteria and ends of everything that there is; and we live, they say, by following these and by paying attention to plain

⁸⁴ With Natorp I read *chrēmasin* for the mss. *krimasin*, instead of Mutschmann's *sugkrimasin*.

⁸⁵ I.e., common to more than one person.

experience and to satisfaction – plain experience as far as the other effects are concerned, but satisfaction as far as pleasure is concerned.

This is what the Cyrenaics' ideas are like. They go further than the Platonists in narrowing the criterion; for the latter made it a combination of plain experience and reason, while the former limit it only to plain experience – that is, effects on us.

Texto 10 (Sexto, *Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes* I 215 = SSR IV A 212; tradução V. Tsouna)

Some people maintain that the Cyrenaic doctrine is the same as the Skepticism, since it too says that only the *pathe* are apprehensible. In fact, it differs from Skepticism because the former maintains that the moral end is pleasure and the smooth movement of the flesh, whereas we say that it is tranquillity, wherefore it is opposed to their conception of the moral end. Whether pleasure is present or absent, the person who affirms that pleasure is the moral end submits to troubles, as I have concluded in the chapter about it. Besides, we suspend judgment about the external objects, as far as the arguments go. The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, affirm that the external objects have an inapprehensible nature.

Texto 11 (Eusébio, *Praeparatio evangelica* XIV ii 4.1-5.1; tradução V. Tsouna)

Aside from the philosophers that have been set forth by us, in this gymnastic contest the stadium will also contain, stripped of all truth, those from the opposite side who took up arms against all the dogmatic philosophers put together (I mean the school of Pyrrho), and who declared that nothing amongst men is comprehensible, and also the school of Aristippus, who maintain that only the *pathe* are apprehensible <μόνα τὰ πάθη εἶναι καταληπτὰ>, and again those the schools of Metrodorus and Protagoras who hold that we must trust only the sensations of the body.

Texto 12 (Diógenes Laércio 86-88 = SSR IV A 172; tradução R. D. Hicks)

Those then who adhered to the teaching of Aristippus and were known as Cyrenaics held the following opinions. They laid down that there are two *pathe*, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth, the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another. The one state is agreeable and the other repellent to all living things. However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his work *On the Sects*, not the settled pleasure following the removal of pains or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus accepts and maintains to be the end. (...) That pleasure is the end is proved by the fact that from our youth up we are instinctively attracted to it and, when we obtain it, seek for nothing more, and shun nothing so much as its opposite, pain.

Texto 13 (Diógenes Laércio 91-92 = SSR IV A 172; tradução R. D. Hicks)

They [the Cyrenaics] say that prudence is a good, though desirable not in itself but on account of its consequences; that we make friends from interested motives, just as we cherish any part of the body so long as we have it; (...) and that wealth too is productive of pleasure, though not desirable for its own sake.

Texto 14 (Diógenes Laércio II 87-88 = SSR IV A 172; tradução K. Lampe)

They also think that the end differs from happiness, since the particular pleasure is an end, but happiness is the composition of particular pleasures, among which are numbered both those that have gone by and those that are to come. The particular pleasure is choiceworthy for itself; happiness is not choiceworthy for itself, but for particular pleasures.

Texto 15 (Diógenes Laércio II 85 SSR IV A 175; tradução U. Zilioli)

He [Aristippus] proclaimed as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation.

Texto 16 (Diógenes Laércio II 89 = SSR IV A 172; tradução R. D. Hicks)

The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus, seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion, whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep.

Texto 17 (Diógenes Laércio X 136-137; tradução R. D Hicks)

He [Epicurus] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work *On Choice and Avoidance* and in that *On the Ethical End*, and in the first book of his work *On Human Life* and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene.

Texto 18 (Diógenes Laércio II 87 = SSR IV A 172; tradução R. D. Hicks)

However, they [the Cyrenaics] insist that bodily pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and bodily pains far worse than mental pains, and that this is the reason why offenders are punished with the former. For they assumed pain to be more repellent, pleasure more congenial. For these reasons they paid more attention to the body than to the mind.

Texto 19 (Diógenes Laércio X 137; tradução R. D. Hicks)

He [Epicurus] further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil-doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.

Texto 20 (Diógenes Laércio II 89-90 = SSR IV A 172; tradução V. Tsouna)

They [the Cyrenaics] do not accept that pleasure consists in the memory of past goods or in the expectation of goods to come, as Epicurus held, for the motion of the soul expires with time.

Texto 21 (Ateneu XII.63 544ab = SSR IV A 174; tradução K. Lampe)

Even whole schools of philosophers have claimed a lifestyle characterized by voluptuousness. There is, for example, the so-called Cyrenaic school, which took its first principle from Aristippus the Socratic. He embraced pleasant living and declared it was the end and happiness is based on it. Furthermore, he said it was unitemporal <μυνόχρονον>. Like wanton

people, he thought neither the memory of enjoyments that had happened nor the hope of ones to come were any concern to him. Rather, he judged the good by only one thing, what was present, and thought it was no concern to him that he had experienced enjoyment or would experience it, since one was no longer and the other was not yet and uncertain. This is also how voluptuaries feel when they resolve to get along well just for the present time.

Texto 22 (Élio, *Varia Historia* XIV.6; tradução K. Lampe)

Aristippus seemed to have a very healthy way of putting things when he advised people neither to exert themselves over what is past nor before what is to come. For this sort of thing is a sign of tranquillity and a way of showing a cheerful mind. He told [people] to keep their attention on the day, then in turn on that part of the day in which each is thinking or doing something. For he always said that only what is present is ours, neither what has already come nor what is still anticipated. For one has perished and it is uncertain if the other will happen.

Texto 23 (Diógenes Laércio II 66; tradução K. Lampe)

Aristippus of able to adapt himself to every place and time and role and to act adeptly in every situation. That is why he was more in favor than others with Dionysius, because he always dealt successfully with whatever happened. For he enjoyed the pleasure of things that were present, and did not hunt painfully after the enjoyment of things that were not present.

Texto 24 (Diógenes Laércio 88-89 = SSR IV A 172; tradução K. Lampe)

Pleasure is good even if it comes from the most unseemly sources, as Hippobotus says in his *On the Sects*. For even if the action is out of place, still the pleasure is choiceworthy for itself and something good.

Texto 25 (Diógenes Laércio II 93 = SSR IV A 172; tradução K. Lampe)

Nothing is just or fine or shameful by nature, but only by custom and habit. Yet the serious man will do nothing out of place because of existing penalties and beliefs.

Texto 26 (Diógenes Laércio II 93-96; tradução R. D. Hicks)

The school of Hegesias, as it is called, adopted the same ends, namely pleasure and pain. In their view there is no such thing as gratitude or friendship or beneficence, because it is not for themselves that we choose to do these things but simply from motives of interest, apart from which such conduct is nowhere found. They denied the possibility of happiness, for the body is infected with much suffering, while the soul shares in the sufferings of the body and is a prey to disturbance, and fortune often disappoints. From all this it follows that happiness cannot be realized. Moreover, life and death are each desirable in turn. But that there is anything naturally pleasant or unpleasant they deny; when some men are pleased and others pained by the same objects, this is owing to the lack or rarity or surfeit of such objects. Poverty and riches have no relevance to pleasure; for neither the rich nor the poor as such have any special share in pleasure. Slavery and freedom, nobility and low birth, honour and dishonour, are alike indifferent in a calculation of pleasure. To the fool life is advantageous, while to the wise it is a matter of indifference. The wise man will be guided in all he does by his own interests, for there is none other whom he regards as equally deserving. For supposing him to reap the greatest advantages from another, they would not be equal to what he contributes himself. They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done. They affirmed that allowance should be made for errors, for no man errs voluntarily, but under constraint of some suffering; that we should not hate men, but rather teach them better. The wise man will not have so much advantage over others in the choice of goods as in the avoidance of evils, making it his end to live without pain of body or mind. This then, they say, is the advantage accruing to those who make no distinction between any of the objects which produce pleasure.

Texto 27 (Diógenes Laércio II 96-97; tradução R. D. Hicks)

The school of Anniceris in other respects agreed with them, but admitted that friendship and gratitude and respect for parents do exist in real life, and that a good man will sometimes act out of patriotic motives. Hence, if the wise man receive annoyance, he will be none the less happy even if few pleasures accrue to him. The happiness of a friend is not in itself desirable, for it is not felt by his neighbour. Instruction is not sufficient in itself to inspire us with confidence and to make us rise superior to the opinion of the multitude. Habits must be formed because of the bad disposition which has grown up in us from the first. A friend should be cherished not merely for his utility – for, if that fails, we should then no longer

associate with him – but for the good feeling for the sake of which we shall even endure hardships. Nay, though we make pleasure the end and are annoyed when deprived of it, we shall nevertheless cheerfully endure this because of our love to our friend.

Texto 28 (Diógenes Laércio II 97-100; tradução R. D. Hicks)

The Theodoreans derived their name from Theororus, who has already been mentioned, and adopted his doctrines. Theodorus was a man who utterly rejected the current belief in the gods. And I have come across a book of his entitled *Of the Gods* which is not contemptible. From that book, they say, Epicurus borrowed most of what he wrote on the subject.

Theodorus was also a pupil of Anniceris and of Dionysius the dialectician, as Antisthenes mentions in his *Successions of Philosophers*. He considered joy and grief <χαρὰν καὶ λύπην> to be the supreme good and evil, the one brought about by wisdom, the other by folly. Wisdom and justice <φρόνησιν καὶ δικαιοσύνην> he called goods, and their opposites evils, pleasure and pain <ἡδονὴν καὶ πόνον> being intermediate to good and evil. Friendship he rejected because it did not exist between the unwise nor between the wise; with the former, when the want is removed, the friendship disappears, whereas the wise are self-sufficient and have no need of friends. It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise.

He said the world was his country. Theft, adultery, and sacrilege would be allowable upon occasion, since none of these acts is by nature base, if once you have removed the prejudice against them, which is kept up in order to hold the foolish multitude together. The wise man would indulge his passions openly without the least regard to circumstances. Hence he would use such arguments as this. “Is a woman who is skilled in grammar useful in so far as she is skilled in grammar?” “Yes.” “And is a boy or a youth skilled in grammar useful in so far as he is skilled in grammar?” “Yes.” “Again, is a woman who is beautiful useful in so far as she is beautiful? And the use of beauty is to be enjoyed?” “Yes.” When this was admitted, he would press the argument to the conclusion, namely, that he who uses anything for the purpose for which it is useful does no wrong. And by some such interrogatories he would carry his point.

He appears to have been called θεός (god) in consequence of the following argument addressed to him by Stilpo. “Are you, Theodorus, what you declare yourself to be?” To this he assented, and Stilpo continued, “And do you say you are god?” To this he agreed. “Then it follows that you are god.” Theodorus accepted this, and Stilpo said with a smile, “But, you rascal, at this rate you would allow yourself to be a jackdaw and ten thousand other things.”